to admit new members into her nuclear family, even if this impacts the makeup of
the extended family as a whole, citizens have no right to limit their co-citizens’ ability to admit new migrants into their social, familial, and economic circles, even if this impacts the state’s population as a whole.

IV. CONCLUSION

If citizens ought not curtail the freedom of other citizens without good justifications, and today’s curtailing of freedoms via immigration policies lacks such justifications, then today’s immigration policies should be discontinued. This exact conclusion is never quite spelled out in the book, and for good reason: Kukathas wishes to primarily focus on making citizens of wealthy countries aware of the freedoms they are personally denied in today’s policies, moving beyond the view that immigration control only wrongs others; you, reader, are probably wronged. If this is the case, all should think carefully about whether the freedoms lost are worth the benefits gained, and whether there are any benefits at all. The book therefore provides the tools and data to be wary of the surveillance, taxes, walls, and detention centers that are instituted when determining which migrants belong and with whom citizens can associate.

MOLLIE GERVER
King’s College London


The resurgence of interest in Nietzsche’s political philosophy in recent decades has not produced any consensus about whether or not he had a political philosophy or, assuming he did, what that might have been. Donovan Miyasaki’s two volumes represent a novel and important incursion into this highly contested field. Nietzsche’s Immoralism (NI) argues that Nietzsche’s philosophy is “at its core a political philosophy—that is, a philosophy of the polis, of the origins, organization, and wellbeing of society” (NI, 197). The first four chapters outline the core philosophical commitments of Nietzsche’s late work and argue that these led him to transform the moral philosophy in his earlier works into a political philosophy dedicated to the “breeding” of higher kinds of humanity. For Miyasaki’s Nietzsche, the higher forms of human existence are those that embody the affirmation of necessity and love of fate (amor fati). The last three chapters reconstruct the late Nietzsche’s political philosophy in light of this ideal and Marx’s historical materialism. They argue that societies, understood “in the specifically materialist sense of material social conditions,” are the cause of moral types (NI, 223). Moralities are entirely superstructural in Marx’s sense of the term, and moral transformation is the consequence of social transformation. While there is much that is controversial in Miyasaki’s interpretation
Politics after Morality (PAM) “extrapolates” a Nietzschean politics on the basis of the core philosophical commitments outlined in Nietzsche’s Immoralism. Miyasaki argues that Nietzsche fails in his attempt to reconstruct a “nostalgic aristocratic politics” (PAM, 260). At best, this would have produced “only the mediocre strength of the simple-minded noble” rather than the health and strength of the manifold soul that Nietzsche’s later philosophy associates with the capacity for amor fati, while its commitment to social hierarchy would have inevitably reproduced the conditions for a “slave revolt in morality” (PAM, 8). The roots of this failure lie in Nietzsche’s attempt to ground an aristocratic social order on the very principles that undermined traditional ideas of authority and the natural moral order, namely modern materialism, determinism, and immoralism. Taking these principles as his point of departure, Miyasaki outlines a nonliberal, “democratic” (in a nonprocedural sense), and socialist political philosophy more consistent with the late Nietzsche’s core commitments. State legitimacy is to be achieved by breeding “healthier, fate-loving, manifold souls whose drive organization or forms of value agency directly reflect and affirm the social order that produced them” (PAM, 8). Against Nietzsche’s own antiegalitarian and antidemocratic views, he argues that higher types “can only be achieved through a democratic egalitarianism of both recognition and distribution, a radical power equilibrium that includes resources, opportunities, and outcomes” (PAM, 10).

Space does not permit discussion of all the elements of this extremely rich discussion of what a Nietzschean political philosophy could be. Instead, I will focus on some aspects of the account of Nietzsche’s core commitments and how these relate to the proposed Nietzschean socialist politics, with a view to the following questions: how far is this a truly Nietzschean political vision, and how far is it a coherent and defensible vision?

The core of the argument in Nietzsche’s Immoralism that the late Nietzsche abandoned moral for political philosophy is the claim that Nietzsche embraced a form of hard determinism that leaves no room for human freedom: for any individual at any moment in time only one future is possible. Miyasaki does not dwell on the reasons for this fatalism but draws attention to his phenomenal understanding of freedom as the experience of agency: “every major account of freedom in Nietzsche’s works will hold strictly to description of the qualitative experience of an illusory freedom” (NI, 34). He supports this claim by close readings of passages otherwise taken to support compatibilist readings of Nietzsche’s determinism, such as the sovereign individual passage in On the Genealogy of Morality (2.2). Miyasaki points out that it does not assert that the sovereign individual is in fact free, but only that it has an awareness, a consciousness, and a “proud knowledge” of itself as such. The passage shows only that “it is characteristic of sovereign individuals to impute to themselves a distinctive, freer form of agency; it is far from evident that Nietzsche shares their belief” (NI, 39).

The interpretative claim that Nietzsche is concerned with the experience rather than the fact of human freedom is important for the reconstruction of his political philosophy. If the aim is enhancement of the individual’s experience of freedom rather than protection of a pregiven freedom against threats from
others or from the state, then the subject matter of politics includes the social relationships on which that experience depends. On Miyasaki’s account, Nietzsche’s rejection of freedom also leads him to reject any morality that presupposes that agents could have acted otherwise and that relies on moral persuasion in the attempt to change their basic motivations. The problem is that, unlike nonmoral forms of persuasion that seek to change actions or intentions on the basis of motives that individuals already possess, moral persuasion “seeks to change our motivations themselves, without appeal to any prior motive except the abstract motive to be moral” (NI, 56). Since Nietzsche rejects the presupposition that individuals are free to change their behavior on the basis of moral exhortation, he regards any such “morality of improvement” as ineffective.

At the same time, Nietzsche’s rejection of the possibility of moral transformation does not mean that he rejects morality altogether. He endorses a project of human improvement or enhancement informed by the ideal of higher human types that Miyasaki initially describes as a moral ideal. Later, he argues that it is not really a moral ideal at all but a political project, namely that of producing higher and better forms of truly human being. Miyasaki develops his account of this ideal in stages: first, with reference to amor fati and the will to power; second, with reference to the distinction between the animal and human forms of the will to power and associated concepts of health; and third, with reference to his conception of the manifold soul characterized by a “modest hierarchy of manifold, proportionately equal drives” (NI, 190). Let me discuss these in turn.

Miyasaki insists that it is the qualitative rather than quantitative understanding of the will to power that is important for human psychology. The quantitative understanding treats it as a matter of the increase of power over oneself and one’s environment, in other words, conquest or domination. The qualitative understanding treats it as a matter of the exercise or expression of the power that an individual has in order to achieve the maximal feeling of power (On the Genealogy of Morality 3.7). He then offers a quite specific account of the conditions under which the optimal achievement of the feeling of power is attained, namely in actions that encounter resistance proportionate to the power of the agent, as opposed to resistance that is too strong or too weak to allow for any enjoyment in the contest. The feeling of power is not simply “the feeling of being equal to a resistance, but also the feeling of a resistance that is one’s equal, a pleasure in the other’s equality as resistance” (NI, 91). On this basis, he argues that the will to power is “a desire for the activity of resisting for its own sake—not merely a desire to resist, but specifically a desire to resist that which resists” (NI, 91). It is this feeling of power that leads to the higher form of human being capable of affirming the necessity of its fate (amor fati).

Miyasaki’s insistence on the importance of the feeling of power is one of the strengths of his interpretation of Nietzsche. Commentators tend to focus on the expression of power over other animals at the expense of the feeling of power, yet it is this feeling that is the important motivation for human action. Individuals experience the feeling of power when they believe that they are acting on something or someone, or even when they vicariously participate in the actions of others. In Human, All Too Human 103, Nietzsche refers to it as a simple “pleasure of gratification in the exercise of power” (Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human: A
Since the conditions under which one exercises power also include the frameworks of interpretation that define possibilities for action, such as sacrifices or prayers to the gods, there is always the possibility of a disjunct between experiencing the feeling of power and actually exercising power. In his middle and late periods, Nietzsche relies on the feeling of power to explain a variety of human emotions and cultural practices, from gratitude and revenge to the excitation of pity in others, from cruelty to animals as a form of entertainment to the equivalence between a wrong committed or a debt owed and inflicting pain on the body of the offender. In *Daybreak* 23 he suggests that “the means discovered for creating this feeling almost constitute the history of culture” (Friedrich Nietzsche, *Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality*, ed. Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter, trans. R. J. Hollingdale [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982], 24).

However, rather than explore the implications of Nietzsche’s moral psychological principle for the history and future of human cultures, Miyasaki narrows the focus to those kinds of action that involve proportionate resistance or the overcoming of resistance, thereby making a degree of equality in the capacities and social relations of individuals central to his account of the highest forms of human action. While this interpretation serves his argument for an egalitarianism in the distribution of power as part of Nietzschean socialist politics, the supporting textual evidence is slight. He cites the passage from *The Anti-Christ*, paragraph 2, where Nietzsche asks, “What is happiness? - The feeling that power is growing, that some resistance has been overcome” (Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings*, ed. Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, trans. Judith Norman [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005], 4). By itself this is not a sufficient reason to discount the many other passages from middle and late works that suggest that the feeling of power can be achieved in situations in which power is exercised or believed to be exercised without the overcoming of resistance. Why limit the means of achieving the feeling of power to forms of contest between proportionately equal parties? Why not consider earlier analyses of circumstances in which agents experience the feeling of power, especially when these draw attention to the interpretative frameworks that define possibilities for action? Perhaps Miyasaki’s commitment to materialism leads him to downplay the importance of such immaterial conditions. His official argument for the priority of passages such as the one from *The Anti-Christ* is the methodological principle of “reading Nietzsche backwards” defended in the second chapter (*NI*, 13, 15). This leads him to privilege works usually regarded as belonging to Nietzsche’s late period from *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886) but even more from 1888, the final year of his writing life: *The Case of Wagner*, *Twilight of the Idols*, *The Anti-Christ*, *Ecce Homo*, and *Nietzsche contra Wagner*. However, the case for this principle is not strong, and the rules of application are far from clear. It does not prevent Miyasaki from drawing on the early essay “Homer’s Contest” in support of the idea that relative equality among parties is important for the achievement of the feeling of power in athletic or other contests (*NI*, 88). He remarks at one point that the principle allows for the identification of surprising continuities between early and late works but offers no guidance as to which continuities are to be acknowledged and which passed over in silence (*NI*, 222).
Returning to the later stages of Miyasaki’s account of Nietzsche’s moral ideal, he first elaborates his idea of a specifically human health that is distinct from an animal health grounded in the purely quantitative aspect of the will to power. Animal health is displayed in the increase of power that Nietzsche describes in *Beyond Good and Evil* 259 as the result of the incorporation and exploitation of those elements of the environment that nourish the animal in question. While human health depends on a base level of this kind of animal health, it adds another layer by virtue of the difference between instincts and drives, as well as the internal structure of drives that defines kinds of human being. Miyasaki returns to the sovereign individual passage in *On the Genealogy of Morality* to argue that it depicts the birth of a specifically human nature: a form of animal life no longer governed by instinct but by socially inculcated drives that make the human animal capable of honoring promises. The turning inward of the will to power occasioned by social constraint produces a being capable of self-mastery, while the exercise of power by some drives over other drives and instincts produces a feeling of power. The final stage of Miyasaki’s account of Nietzsche’s moral ideal argues that the optimal achievement of the feeling of power results from a manifold soul that “consists of many, diverse, contrary, and proportionately powerful drives, each strong enough to lead to successful action and satisfy its own distinctive aims, generating its own distinctive forms of pleasure and power” (*NI*, 196). In contrast to the rigid hierarchical organization of the drives in both the older forms of noble master and the sovereign individual, the manifold soul is characterized by a modest hierarchy of drives that enables agency both internally and in relation to the external environment. The more complex this internal structure of the drives, the healthier is the human type, hence the insistence on the multidimensionality of the manifold soul.

Together, these successive stages fill out a conception of human health that enables us to identify higher and lower forms of humanity. However, Miyasaki argues, this is not a moral ideal since it refers to the conditions of moral agency: “health and decadence are not moral choices, nor effects of our moral choices, but rather the very cause of morality, the cause of the kind of agents we are and the kind of moral choices we make” (*NI*, 158). Health is not something that agents can be persuaded to pursue. It is not something they ought to achieve but something they do, with greater or lesser degrees of effectiveness. The tension in this account between viewing Nietzsche’s ideal of human health as normative and viewing it as empirical resembles the ambivalence in Marx’s account of capitalism that has produced endless debate over whether or not he had or should have had a theory of justice. Indeed, Miyasaki suggests in a footnote that Marx’s “awkward, sometimes contradictory, synthesis of anti-normative determinism and normative politics” anticipates that of Nietzsche (*NI*, 198). The same might be said of Miyasaki’s own historical materialist interpretation of Nietzsche, to which we now turn.

Nietzsche’s rejection of moral means of improvement poses a problem: how is improvement in the nature or type of human being possible? The key thesis of *Nietzsche’s Immoralism* is that this ideal can only be achieved through politics, “through the social production of individuals who instantiate that ideal as a type, rather than through the conversion of individuals to that type” (*NI*, 114). Miyasaki’s answer to the question of how this social production takes place begins
with his reading of *On the Genealogy of Morality* as “a key work in the history of historical materialism” (*NI*, 250). The first essay shows how both master and slave moralities are the product of a political, economic, and cultural inequality that is pervasive and constantly encountered in the daily lives of individuals, producing, on the one hand, a sense of superiority, pride, and contempt and, on the other hand, hatred and resentment. The second essay shows how “an unguided, accidental process of domestication” led to the emergence of kinds of moralities and agent-types (*NI*, 230). The larger purpose of this text is to determine “how to turn the accidental social domestication of the human animal into a conscious process of breeding or manufacturing higher human types” (*NI*, 230). In support of the idea that “Nietzsche’s goal is now to redirect history’s accidental processes of breeding into a consciously directed political project” (*NI*, 232), Miyasaki refers to Nietzsche’s question in *The Anti-Christ*, paragraph 3: “what type of human being should be *bred*, should be *willed* as having greater value, as being more deserving of life, as being more certain of a future” (*NI*, 232).

At this point, Miyasaki’s combination of Nietzsche and Marx strains against the limits of coherence. The argument that the early Nietzsche’s moral philosophy is superseded by political philosophy rests on the incompatibility between hard determinism and any project of individual transformation by means of moral persuasion. However, the same argument applies at the social level. The idea of societies choosing what future types they ought to produce, as a matter of conscious policy, seems just as incompatible with Nietzsche’s determinism as the language of individual free choice. Either the material conditions of the society and their evolution over time will lead to such policies, or they will not. Miyasaki sometimes regards the determination of social will as no less strictly an effect of prior material conditions than individual will, but this leaves little room for a Nietzschean politics understood as the conscious ordering of society with a view to producing higher types of human being. This problem is explicitly recognized in *Politics after Morality*: “if there is no morally substantial form of freedom or agency, no true self-determination on the individual level, then neither can there be a morally substantial form of self-determination on the social level. . . . Just as an individual’s character, thoughts, beliefs, and actions are entirely determined by their physiological, psychological, and sociological history, so the actions of a collective agency or people are entirely determined by the physiological, psychological, and sociological facts about its members” (*PAM*, 159–60). Miyasaki’s solution is to redefine democracy, and politics more generally, as an entirely causal process such that “democracy is an illusion, just like moral freedom and agency-free will” (*PAM*, 161). However, this leads to other problems. Whereas in the case of individuals the illusion of freedom that is a consequence of genuine agency is experienced by the agent, in pluralistic societies the feeling of collective freedom that results from identification with the popular will can only be experienced by some at the expense of the feeling of power of others. This leads Miyasaki to redefine Nietzschean democracy as the maintenance of an equilibrium between the feeling of power of the individuals and groups that make up the society. A Nietzschean democracy will seek to establish the material conditions that will produce future manifold souls. It is not a matter of rule by the people but rule for the people in the sense that it reflects a popular will that accords with the people’s long-term interest. In turn, this leads to a disturbing disdain for
institutions and procedures whereby “any society that produces a popular will in lasting harmony with the political order that produced it is democratic” and it is irrelevant “how that will came about or failed to come about” (PAM, 171). Miyasaki’s attempt to reconcile Nietzsche’s determinism with a deliberate politics aimed at the production of higher types thus leads to a cascade of further problems. The attempt to explain and justify a nonliberal, immoralist democracy raises the specter of an interventionist revolutionary state capable of exerting “dramatic control” over the economic life of its citizens (PAM, 257). His responses to these further problems do not resolve the underlying tensions between determinism and freedom, between the causal conditions of higher human types and conscious government policies, or between a Nietzschean political philosophy based on an ideal of human enhancement that embodies the “real interests” (NI, 254) of humanity and one based on a purely descriptive account of human moral and social development.

The concluding chapter outlines a conception of political practice informed by Nietzsche’s core philosophical commitments. This would be a form of tragic realism that affirms the innocence of becoming and the nonresponsibility of human beings for what they are, think, and do. It would be immoralist in abandoning the moral language of praise and blame and the “politics of punishing and proscribing” (PAM, 269), seeking solutions to social and political problems in the material conditions of individual and group behavior, rather than in the distribution of reward and punishment. Finally, it would be anti-utopian in rejecting the belief in a single revolutionary moment that permanently alters the course of history in favor of a permanent revolutionary state prepared to override individual liberties in order to maintain a proportional equality of power relations among its citizens. Only a political order of this kind, Miyasaki argues, can enable citizens to achieve a degree of equality in their feeling of power or freedom and to affirm their condition without qualification. While there is much that is cause for concern in this vision of Nietzschean left politics, there is also much to admire. Either way, these two volumes make an important contribution to ongoing efforts to understand Nietzsche’s political philosophy and to develop a version that is useful to socialism.

Paul Patton
Wuhan University

Protasi, Sara. *The Philosophy of Envy.*

This is an excellent book—philosophy at its best, and a pleasure to read. Protasi is familiar with the vast literature on envy, from ancient times to present day, persuasively presenting the strengths and flaws attributed to such an emotion. The conceptual philosophical discussion is grounded in ample psychological evidence. The arguments are clear, with precise presentations of the claims at the beginning and a cogent summary following every section and chapter. The discussion is witty and full of enlightening everyday examples. The book is rich with original and thoughtful ideas.